### Volcker Colloquies

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Sen. Scott Brown Statement

Madam President, I come to the floor of the Senate to talk today about the recently passed Wall Street reform bill. I believe elected officials should come to Washington to solve problems not ignore them. The American people know that we need to enact major changes to our financial regulatory system. With the bill that passed into law earlier this month, Congress has begun the process of repairing a regulatory system that did not work as it should have and contributed to the financial meltdown that shook our economy in 2008. This action, long overdue, will help our regulatory structure catch up with the realities of the market so as to provide a more secure economy. Although no bill will ever be perfect, and I remain seriously concerned that we must take further actions if we are going to prevent another financial crisis, this bill takes important steps towards greater market transparency and consumer protection. It will help make sure that taxpayers are never again put on the hook for bailing out the financial sector. It strengthens the regulatory safety net in key respects. For these reasons, I supported cloture motions and final passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

I did my utmost to work in a bipartisan manner on this bill, filing or cosponsoring 27 amendments, working across the aisle on almost all of them. For example, we amended the bill to remove unnecessary provisions that would have severely constricted small startup businesses around the country as they worked to raise capital from angel investors. Massachusetts is one of America’s hotbeds for innovation and business startups, and I was proud to stand up for small startup businesses and the investors who help give life to their ideas. Another amendment I proposed with Senator JACK REED of Rhode Island, which was adopted 99–1, created a dedicated liaison office for military families within the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, so that members of our Armed Forces and their families can fight back when they are targeted by unscrupulous lenders or sold fraudulent life insurance policies. As a 30-year member of the National Guard, I have seen the pain caused when members of the Guard are hit by financial predators. I was also proud to join my colleagues in supporting assessment and regulatory relief for small community banks and a safer role for the credit rating agencies in our financial system.

Since the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs did not hold a full markup of the bill before it came to the Senate floor, I spent a lot of time exploring how certain provisions were drafted and how they might work if enacted into law. One of those areas was the so-called Volcker rule. I believe that the principles behind the Volcker rule, which was proposed in earnest only after the House had passed its own Wall Street Reform bill, are very well-intentioned and in many respects will be quite effective. The Volcker rule was conceived as a way to limit certain risky proprietary trading activities so that Wall Street firms start to look more like the safe banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies we have in Massachusetts. After the collapse the country suffered, no one can argue with a straight face anymore that all banks should be able to take huge risks on anything they want, whenever they want, without any regard to the consequences. This was an important issue for financial institutions and regulators across the country. Senator KAY HAGAN of North Carolina also worked hard to find the right balance within the Volcker rule for bank asset management, and I would like to associate my views with her statements in the Senate RECORD on this topic.

Without changes, the original Senate bill would have unreasonably regulated limited purpose trusts— institutions throughout our Nation that never should have been captured in the regulatory “net” of Volcker rule bank regulation. Since the drafting did not match the intent, this problem was addressed by clarifying that these companies should not be subject to bank holding company oversight or the Volcker rule restrictions by virtue of operating a limited purpose trust regardless of charter. In other words, bank regulation should only apply to the trust itself, not its parent and affiliates. Without this clarification, the Volcker rule restrictions, as well as the capital requirements under the adopted
Collins amendment, would have led to widespread disruption in providing products and services to customers and investors, job losses, and uncertainty around the nation. The final version of the legislation appropriately does not regulate institutions with limited trusts—including mutual funds and insurance companies—because these institutions do not take customer deposits, make loans, or access the Fed discount window.

The original Volcker rule also would have gone too far in preventing banks from offering appropriate investment services to their clients as a limited and safe part of their business model. At a time of deep economic uncertainty, when millions of Americans are looking for work, this could have a devastating impact on jobs in Massachusetts and across the country while unfairly targeting safe institutions and driving their business to riskier ventures. Even the Glass-Steagall law clearly permitted banks to serve as investment advisers, and yet the original Volcker rule language threatened the ability of banks to offer these services, including seeding new investment funds that they then offer to clients.

Bank-affiliated investment funds are sponsored for clients and comprised almost entirely of client money. Most are not excessively speculative or risky investment vehicles—they include simple cash funds, stock index funds, and other nonleveraged strategies. Preventing banks from offering such services, which provide banks with a steady source of fee income, will make the banks more reliant on other more volatile revenue streams—a danger the bill was supposed to head off. Furthermore, in order to remain in the asset management business, these banks must be allowed to invest a very small amount alongside their clients in these funds so that all interests are aligned. Many large state pension plans, as well as large endowments and foundations, value such “skin in the game” investments as a key factor in deciding with whom they will place their money.

If banks can’t offer these services or invest a small amount to seed funds and keep skin in the game, institutional investors will be forced to take their money elsewhere, and in many cases, that will be to less regulated hedge and private equity funds. In negotiations during Senate consideration of the legislation, I advocated for limiting the maximum aggregate investment level in all bank affiliated funds to somewhere in the vicinity of 5 percent of a bank’s tier 1 capital. In the end, the final compromise landed on 3 percent. Although it could be higher, this is an appropriate role for alternative asset management within the banking industry.

To put this number in perspective, even if all of these investments collapsed, the bank losses would equal only half of the typical losses charged off from bank retail lending operations last year. To address concerns that fresh bank capital could be put at risk in the event of a fund failure, the final language makes it explicit that these investment funds are segregated and that it is against the law for the banks to bail them out. It is also important to remember that new systemic risk authorities have been created to identify and halt activities at key firms that threaten financial stability.

One other area of remaining uncertainty that has been left to the regulators is the treatment of bank investments in venture capital funds. Regulators should carefully consider whether banks that focus overwhelmingly on lending to and investing in start-up technology companies should be captured by one-size-fits-all restrictions under the Volcker rule. I believe they should not be. Venture capital investments help entrepreneurs get the financing they need to create new jobs. Unfairly restricting this type of capital formation is the last thing we should be doing in this economy.

Another area of potential confusion is in the language governing “fund of funds.” These are funds that invest in a wide range of other investment partnerships, hedge funds or private equity funds, so that investors can benefit from the good investment ideas of a variety of funds. Banks’ investments in the fund of funds that they sponsor for clients are to be limited under this bill to only 3 percent of the fund. But that fund, which will be comprised of, at a minimum, 97 percent client money, under Dodd-Frank, is not restricted as a percentage of any of those investment partnerships, hedge funds, or private equity funds that it might be invested in, because the bank’s exposure is still limited to 3 percent in the original fund, mitigating any chance of a concentration risk or bailout incentive.
Finally—and this should go without saying—I want to make it clear that throughout all the negotiations to write the legislative language of the conference report, it was always clear to me that the Volcker rule was never intended to prohibit banks from offering alternative investment options as a part of a company-wide retirement plan, or as an offering to ERISA customers. Any other regulatory treatment would be arbitrarily punitive and would have no public policy impact. The legislation is clear on this, but I would also like to point out that the FDIC-sanctioned traditional bond and equity market investments made by small community banks for the purpose of diversification are not the intended target of Volcker rule restrictions.

I want to spend a moment or two discussing consumer protection—one of the most controversial elements of this bill. During the crisis, more than half of the people who ended up in subprime mortgages with ballooning rates would have qualified for more conventional fixed rate loans. Some of that was caused by consumer greed, but it was also because of bad incentives and deceptive practices where the true costs of loans were hidden in the fine print. The new CFPB has the power to use its broad authority to simplify and dramatically improve the quality of information going to the consumer, and I expect that’s how they will use their authority. I also expect that unifying financial consumer protection under one roof at the Federal Reserve will help to simplify and consolidate some of the compliance burdens on our financial institutions. Talking to local bankers, it is clear that banks are being forced to spend a lot more money and time on compliance. I worry about community banks’ ability to compete in this area with the bigger banks. I am hopeful that the CFPB will improve the current state of affairs on both of these fronts.

There are a number of other provisions in the bill that bear review. Section 113 of the conference report details multiple criteria that must be considered by the Financial Stability Oversight Council to determine that an institution is a “nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors.” These criteria should not be given equal weighting. In fact, the Council should place most of the weight on one important measure—the leverage of the financial institution. If the recent financial crisis has proven anything, it has demonstrated the systemic de-stabilization that can be caused when too many firms are overleveraged, with only a slim cushion available to absorb losses. Excessive leverage is by far the most dangerous characteristic for any business. A poorly run company that faces numerous problems can feel relatively safe if it has limited leverage; conversely, a thriving, profitable company that has excessive leverage can be wiped out after a single stumble. As a result, leverage should be the primary consideration when deciding whether to put a financial institution into the special category of “nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors.”

I also believe that the size of an institution should be de-emphasized as a consideration for making determinations as to which companies are “nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors.” There is nothing inherently destabilizing or risky about the size of a large company. If anything, size usually coincides with significant benefits, including economies of scale and a diverse portfolio of assets. The Council and regulators should be very careful not to use size as a proxy for risk or it will capture some very healthy companies in the Fed supervisory web while simultaneously discouraging the growth of up-and-coming firms. Size is not as important a factor when it comes to the safety and soundness of an institution and it should be given less weight as a consideration. Furthermore, considering the burdens that come with being categorized a “nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors,” it is critical that the Council make its determinations on a company-by-company basis and not attempt to make determinations by grouping multiple set of similar characteristics. For instance, the Council should never make a determination that all firms in a financial subsector that are above a predefined size should be “nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors.” This would inevitably subject otherwise healthy firms to a long list of unnecessary regulations and will distract regulators from focusing on the most potentially problematic financial firms and activities.
In title II of the bill, the orderly liquidation authority includes provisions that allow the FDIC to unwind firms that threaten stability. While I repeatedly supported amendments that would have relied more heavily on the bankruptcy code rather than this approach, I also believe that if used appropriately, resolution authorities can be an important and useful tool in unwinding financial institutions that threaten market stability. I will be watching closely as these provisions are implemented by the FDIC. Under this section, the FDIC has the power to “take any action” to provide disparate treatment to similarly situated creditors if the FDIC “determines that such action is necessary to maximize the value of assets of the covered financial company; to initiate and continue operations essential to the receivership of the financial company; to maximize the present value return from the sale or other disposition of the assets of the covered financial company; or to minimize the amount of any loss realized upon the sale or other disposition of the assets of the covered financial company.”

Without clear rule writing, this language could be wrongly interpreted to include a range of unnecessary, arbitrary actions to favor certain creditors. Instead, the FDIC should only provide disparate treatment to similarly situated creditors if the sole purpose of the action is to cover the cost of indispensable services required to keep the physical operations of the financial institution or bridge financial company functioning during the early stages of liquidation. Examples of such services include the delivery of electricity, computer maintenance and janitorial services. The flexibility in these provisions should not be used by the FDIC to provide disparate treatment to holders of financial instruments, especially financial instruments that are widely distributed and held by multiple parties. For instance, issuances of loans, notes and bonds are normally held by various parties. The FDIC should not use its authority to discriminate among holders of the same instrument or holders that own different instruments that hold the same unsecured priority. In other words, it would be a clear abuse of these provisions if the FDIC makes a determination to provide disparate treatment to similarly situated creditors based on “who” owns the claim. The FDIC should take all necessary precautions to avoid even the impression of playing political favorites. The expectation of receiving a financial return consistent with similarly situated creditors is a bedrock principal of American capitalism. It is my hope and expectation that the FDIC will fulfill its obligations and report to Congress any actions that involve any different treatment of similarly situated creditors under resolution authority. The FDIC should disclose the details of any parties given disparate treatment and the categories and names of similarly situated parties that did not receive the benefits of this treatment; how much, in absolute dollars, and as a percentage of its claim, a favored recipient of the disparate treatment received, and how that compares to the returns realized—or may be realized—by similarly situated creditors who did not receive the favorable treatment; and a thorough explanation as to why the treatment was necessary to maintain the physical operations of the financial institution or relevant entity, including an analysis of any conflicts of interest that the FDIC, or related government authorities, may have had when providing the disparate treatment.

I also want to be clear about my views on derivatives regulation. The derivatives title of the law is extremely important, and if implemented appropriately, will bring much needed transparency and accountability to a market that played a central role in the near collapse of our financial services sector in the fall of 2008. This bill appropriately regulates large Wall Street swap dealers for the first time by subjecting them to new clearing, capital and margin requirements. But these provisions also could significantly impact thousands of end-user firms that use derivatives to reduce their exposure to risk rather than merely to speculate. It is very important that we manage how this bill impacts these Main Street businesses. If the regulations imposed on swap dealers are inappropriately extended to Main Street businesses that are only trying to hedge risks, we could unwittingly exacerbate the economic challenges we still face. Many experts think that greater transparency will drive risk-management costs down for businesses in the long run, but the government clearly needs to go about the implementation of these provisions very carefully.

While the conference report has many good features, it also suffers from a glaring omission: any attempt to regulate government-sponsored enterprises—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These
institutions played a key role in triggering the financial crisis we suffered. To date, over $140 billion of
taxpayer funds have been spent bailing out Fannie and Freddie, and estimates of additional risk to
taxpayers runs into the hundreds of billions of dollars. We clearly need to address these institutions,
which risk burdening future generations of Americans with mountains of debt. I look forward to
working on this issue as soon as Congress and the administration move forward on legislative
proposals. I believe we had a choice: do nothing or try to address a real problem that shook the very
financial foundation of our country. While the bill was far from perfect, the final version was vastly
improved from the version we started with at the beginning of the process. I believe it includes
important measures that will help prevent another financial meltdown like the one in 2008 that left
millions of Americans out of work and saw our economy take its worst dip since the Great Depression.
Equally important, the bill is not funded through higher taxes, which is something I could not support
at a time when nearly one in ten Americans is unemployed and our economy is still struggling.

• Hagan Statement

Madam President, I rise today to discuss the conference agreement on financial services regulatory
reform and specifically an issue in section 619 of title VI, known as the Volcker rule. The section's
limitations on financial organizations that own a depository institution from investing or sponsoring in
hedge funds or investments in private equity to 3 percent of an organization's assets, in the aggregate,
references "tier 1 capital." The term "tier 1 capital" is a concept currently applied strictly to banks and
bank holding companies and consists of core capital, which includes equity capital and disclosed
reserves. However, there are financial organizations subject to the Volcker rule's investment
constraints that do not have a principal regulator that utilizes tier 1 capital measurements to
determine an entity's financial strength. In order to ensure a level playing field with traditional banks, I
would hope the appropriate regulators would determine a suitable equivalent of tier 1 capital to
determine the investment limit, while still satisfying the intent of the Volcker rule. I ask the regulators
to make certain that these types of financial organizations will be subject to the Volcker rule in a
manner that takes into account their unique structure. In addition, I am pleased that as part of the
conference report that the Volcker language was modified to permit a banking entity to engage in a
certain level of traditional asset management business, including the ability to sponsor and offer
hedge and private equity funds. With that in mind, I wanted to clarify certain details around this
authority. First, I was pleased to see that the Volcker Rule, as modified, will permit banking entities
several years to bring their full range of activities into conformance with the new rule. In particular,
section 619(c)(2) ensures that the new investment restrictions under section 619(d)(1)(G)(iii) and
section 619(d)(4)-including the numerical limitations under section 619(d)(4)(B)(ii)-will only apply to a
banking entity at the end of the period that is 2 years after the section's effective date. This date for
the regulators to begin applying the new rules can also be extended into the future for up to three 1-
year periods under section 619(c)(2) and can also separately be extended for illiquid funds with
contractual commitments as of May 1, 2010, under section 619(c)(3), on a one-time basis for up to 5
years. Only after all of these time periods and extensions have run will any of the limitations under
section 619(d)(1)(G) and section 619(d)(4) be applied by regulators. Second, as an added protection,
section 619(f) applies sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act to transactions between all of
a banking entity's affiliates and hedge or private equity funds where the banking entity organizes,
offers, serves as an investment manager, investment adviser, or sponsor of such funds under section
619(d). These restrictions are also applied to transactions between a banking entity's affiliates and
other funds that are "controlled" by a hedge or private equity fund permitted for the banking entity
under 619(d). Importantly, these 23A and 23B restrictions do not apply to funds not "controlled" by
funds permitted for the banking entity under section 619(d), and it should also be clear that under
section 619 there are no new restrictions or limitations of any type placed on the portfolio investments
of any hedge or private equity fund permitted for a banking entity under section 619. Third, as a
condition of sponsorship, section 619(d)(1)(G)(v) requires that a banking entity does not, directly or
in-directly, guarantee or assume or otherwise insure the obligations or performance of any sponsored hedge or private equity fund or of any other hedge or private equity fund in which the sponsored fund invests. While this restricts guarantees by the banking entity as well as the insuring of obligation or performance, it does not limit other normal banking relations with funds merely due to a noncontrol investment by a fund sponsored by the banking entity. As described above, section 619(f) limits transactions under 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act with a fund "controlled" by the banking entity or a fund sponsored by the banking entity. However, 619(f) does not limit in any manner transactions and normal banking relationships with a fund not "controlled" by the banking entity or a fund sponsored by the banking entity. Finally, section 619(d)(4)(I) permits certain banking entities to operate hedge and private equity funds outside of the United States provided that no ownership interest in any hedge or private equity fund is offered for sale or sold to a U.S. resident. For consistency's sake, I would expect that, apart from the U.S. marketing restrictions, these provisions will be applied by the regulators in conformity(16,5),(996,990)

- **Merkley-Levin Colloquy**

  **Mr. MERKLEY**

  I thank Senator Levin and will be setting forth here our joint explanation of the Merkley-Levin provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. Sections 619, 620 and 621 do three things: prohibit high-risk proprietary trading at banks, limit the systemic risk of such activities at systemically significant nonbank financial companies, and prohibit material conflicts of interest in asset-backed securitizations.

  Sections 619 and 620 amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to broadly prohibit proprietary trading, while nevertheless permitting certain activities that may technically fall within the definition of proprietary trading but which are, in fact, safer, client-oriented financial services. To account for the additional risk of proprietary trading among systemically critical financial firms that are not banks, bank holding companies, or the like, the sections require nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve Board, the "Board", to keep additional capital for their proprietary trading activities and subject them to quantitative limits on those activities. In addition, given the unique control that firms who package and sell asset-backed securities (including synthetic asset-backed securities) have over transactions involving those securities, section 621 protects purchasers by prohibiting those firms from engaging in transactions that involve or result in material conflicts of interest.

  First, it is important to remind our colleagues how the financial crisis of the past several years came to pass. Beginning in the 1980's, new financial products and significant amounts of deregulation undermined the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of commercial banking from securities brokerage or "investment banking" that had kept our banking system relatively safe since 1933.

  Over time, commercial and investment banks increasingly relied on precarious short term funding sources, while at the same time significantly increasing their leverage. It was as if our banks and securities firms, in competing against one another, were race car drivers taking the curves ever more tightly and at ever faster speeds. Meanwhile, to match their short-term funding sources, commercial and investment banks drove into increasingly risky, short-term, and some-times theoretically hedged, proprietary trading. When markets took unexpected turns, such as when Russia defaulted on its debt and when the U.S. mortgage-backed securities market collapsed, liquidity evaporated, and financial firms became insolvent very rapidly. No amount of capital could provide a sufficient buffer in such situations.
In the face of the worst financial crisis in 60 years, the January 2009 report by the Group of 30, an international group of financial experts, placed blame squarely on proprietary trading. This report, largely authored by former Federal Reserve System Chairman Paul Volcker, recommended prohibiting systemically critical banking institutions from trading in securities and other products for their own accounts. In January 2010, President Barack Obama gave his full support to common-sense restrictions on proprietary trading and fund investing, which he coined the "Volcker Rule."

The "Volcker Rule," which Senator Levin and I drafted and have championed in the Senate, and which is embodied in section 619, embraces the spirit of the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of "commercial" from "investment" banking by restoring a protective barrier around our critical financial infrastructure. It covers not simply securities, but also derivatives and other financial products. It applies not only to banks, but also to nonbank financial firms whose size and function render them systemically significant.

While the intent of section 619 is to restore the purpose of the Glass-Steagall barrier between commercial and investment banks, we also update that barrier to reflect the modern financial world and permit a broad array of low-risk, client-oriented financial services. As a result, the barrier constructed in section 619 will not restrict most financial firms.

Section 619 is intended to limit proprietary trading by banking entities and systemically significant nonbank financial companies. Properly implemented, section 619's limits will tamp down on the risk to the system arising from firms competing to obtain greater and greater returns by increasing the size, leverage, and riskiness of their trades. This is a critical part of ending too big to fail financial firms. In addition, section 619 seeks to reorient the U.S. banking system away from leveraged, short-term speculation and instead towards the safe and sound provision of long-term credit to families and business enterprises.

We recognize that regulators are essential partners in the legislative process. Because regulatory interpretation is so critical to the success of the rule, we will now set forth, as the principal authors of Sections 619 to 621, our explanations of how these provisions work.

Section 619's prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading are set forth in a new section 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and subsection (a), paragraph (1) establishes the basic principle clearly: a banking entity shall not "engage in proprietary trading" or "acquire or retain . . . ownership interest[s] in or sponsor a hedge fund or private equity fund", unless otherwise provided in the section. Paragraph (2) establishes the principle for nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board by subjecting their proprietary trading activities to quantitative restrictions and additional capital charges. Such quantitative limits and capital charges are to be set by the regulators to address risks similar to those which lead to the flat prohibition for banking entities.

Subsection (h), paragraph (1) defines "banking entity" to be any insured depository institution (as otherwise defined under the Bank Holding Company Act), any entity that controls an insured depository institution, any entity that is treated as a bank holding company under section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliates or subsidiaries of such entities. We and the Congress specifically rejected proposals to exclude the affiliates and subsidiaries of bank holding companies and insured depository institutions, because it was obvious that restricting a bank, but not its affiliates and subsidiaries, would ultimately be ineffective in restraining the type of high-risk proprietary trading that can undermine an insured depository institution.

The provision recognizes the modern reality that it is difficult to separate the fate of a bank and its bank holding company, and that for the bank holding company to be a source of strength to the bank, its activities, and those of its other subsidiaries and affiliates, cannot be at such great risk as to imperil the bank. We also note that not all banks pose the same risks. Accordingly, the
paragraph provides a narrow exception for insured depository institutions that function principally for trust purposes and do not hold public depositor money, make loans, or access Federal Reserve lending or payment services. These specialized entities that offer very limited trust services are elsewhere carved out of the definition of "bank," so we do not treat them as banks for the purposes of the restriction on proprietary trading. However, such institutions are covered by the restriction if they qualify under the provisions covering systemically important nonbank financial companies.

Subsection (h), paragraph (3) defines nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board to be those financial companies whose size, interconnectedness, or core functions are of sufficiently systemic significance as to warrant additional supervision, as directed by the Financial Stability Oversight Council pursuant to Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act. Given the varied nature of such nonbank financial companies, for some of which proprietary trading is effectively their business, an outright statutory prohibition on such trading was not warranted. Instead, the risks posed by their proprietary trading is addressed through robust capital charges and quantitative limits that increase with the size, interconnectedness, and systemic importance of the business functions of the nonbank financial firm. These restrictions should become stricter as size, leverage, and other factors increase. As with banking entities, these restrictions should also help reduce the size and risk of these financial firms.

Naturally, the definition of "proprietary trading" is critical to the provision. For the purposes of section 13, proprietary trading means "engaging as a principal for the trading account" in transactions to "purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of" a wide range of traded financial products, including securities, derivatives, futures, and options. There are essentially three key elements to the definition: (1) the firm must be acting "as a principal," (2) the trading must be in its "trading account" or another similar account, and (3) the restrictions apply to the full range of its financial instruments.

Purchasing or selling "as a principal" refers to when the firm purchases or sells the relevant financial instrument for its own account. The prohibition on proprietary trading does not cover trading engaged with exclusively client funds.

The term "trading account" is intended to cover an account used by a firm to make profits from relatively short-term trading positions, as opposed to long-term, multi-year investments. The administration's proposed Volcker Rule focused on short-term trading, using the phrase "trading book" to capture that concept. That phrase, which is currently used by some bank regulators was rejected, however, and the ultimate conference report language uses the term "trading account" rather than "trading book" to ensure that all types of accounts used for proprietary trading are covered by the section.

To ensure broad coverage of the prohibition on proprietary trading, paragraph (3) of subsection (h) defines "trading account" as any account used "principally for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements)" and such other accounts as the regulators determine are properly covered by the provision to fulfill the purposes of the section. In designing this definition, we were aware of bank regulatory capital rules that distinguish between short-term trading and long-term investments, and our overall focus was to restrict high-risk proprietary trading. For banking entity subsidiaries that do not maintain a distinction between a trading account and an investment account, all accounts should be presumed to be trading accounts and covered by the restriction.

Linking the prohibition on proprietary trading to trading accounts permits banking entities to hold debt securities and other financial instruments in long-term investment portfolios. Such investments should be maintained with the appropriate capital charges and held for longer periods.
The definition of proprietary trading in paragraph (4) covers a wide range of financial instruments, including securities, commodities, futures, options, derivatives, and any similar financial instruments. Pursuant to the rule of construction in subsection (g), paragraph (2), the definition should not generally include loans sold in the process of securitizing; however, it could include such loans if such loans become financial instruments traded to capture the change in their market value.

Limiting the definition of proprietary trading to near-term holdings has the advantage of permitting banking entities to continue to deploy credit via long-term capital market debt instruments. However, it has the disadvantage of failing to prevent the problems created by longer-term holdings in riskier financial instruments, for example, highly complex collateralized debt obligations and other opaque instruments that are not readily marketable. To address the risks to the banking system arising from those longer-term instruments and related trading, section 620 directs Federal banking regulators to sift through the assets, trading strategies, and other investments of banking entities to identify assets or activities that pose unacceptable risks to banks, even when held in longer-term accounts. Regulators are expected to apply the lessons of that analysis to tighten the range of investments and activities permissible for banking entities, whether they are at the insured depository institution or at an affiliate or subsidiary, and whether they are short or long term in nature.

The new Bank Holding Company Act section 13 also restricts investing in or sponsoring hedge funds and private equity funds. Clearly, if a financial firm were able to structure its proprietary positions simply as an investment in a hedge fund or private equity fund, the prohibition on proprietary trading would be easily avoided, and the risks to the firm and its subsidiaries and affiliates would continue. A financial institution that sponsors or manages a hedge fund or private equity fund also incurs significant risk even when it does not invest in the fund it manages or sponsors. Although piercing the corporate veil between a fund and its sponsoring entity may be difficult, recent history demonstrates that a financial firm will often feel compelled by reputational demands and relationship preservation concerns to bail out clients in a failed fund that it managed or sponsored, rather than risk litigation or lost business. Knowledge of such concerns creates a moral hazard among clients, attracting investment into managed or sponsored funds on the assumption that the sponsoring bank or systemically significant firm will rescue them if markets turn south, as was done by a number of firms during the 2008 crisis. That is why setting limits on involvement in hedge funds and private equity funds is critical to protecting against risks arising from asset management services.

Subsection (h), paragraph (2) sets forth a broad definition of hedge fund and private equity fund, not distinguishing between the two. The definition includes any company that would be an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, but is excluded from such coverage by the provisions of sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7). Although market practice in many cases distinguishes between hedge funds, which tend to be trading vehicles, and private equity funds, which tend to own entire companies, both types of funds can engage in high risk activities and it is exceedingly difficult to limit those risks by focusing on only one type of entity.

Despite the broad prohibition on proprietary trading set forth in subsection (a), the legislation recognizes that there are a number of low-risk proprietary activities that do not pose unreasonable risks and explicitly permits those activities to occur. Those low-risk proprietary trading activities are identified in subsection (d), paragraph (1), subject to certain limitations set forth in paragraph (2), and additional capital charges required in paragraph (3).

While paragraph (1) authorizes several permitted activities, it simultaneously grants regulators broad authority to set further restrictions on any of those activities and to supplement the additional capital charges provided for by paragraph (3).
Subparagraph (d)(1)(A) authorizes the purchase or sale of government obligations, including government-sponsored enterprise, GSE, obligations, on the grounds that such products are used as low-risk, short-term liquidity positions and as low-risk collateral in a wide range of transactions, and so are appropriately retained in a trading account. Allowing trading in a broad range of GSE obligations is also meant to recognize a market reality that removing the use of these securities as liquidity and collateral positions would have significant market implications, including negative implications for the housing and farm credit markets. By authorizing trading in GSE obligations, the language is not meant to imply a view as to GSE operations or structure over the long-term, and permits regulators to add restrictions on this permitted activity as necessary to prevent high-risk proprietary trading activities under paragraph (2). When GSE reform occurs, we expect these provisions to be adjusted accordingly. Moreover, as is the case with all permitted activities under paragraph (1), regulators are expected to apply additional capital restrictions under paragraph (3) as necessary to account for the risks of the trading activities.

Subparagraph (d)(1)(B) permits underwriting and market-making-related transactions that are technically trading for the account of the firm but, in fact, facilitate the provision of near-term client-oriented financial services. Market-making is a customer service whereby a firm assists its customers by providing two-sided markets for speedy acquisition or disposition of certain financial instruments. Done properly, it is not a speculative enterprise, and revenues for the firm should largely arise from the provision of credit provided, and not from the capital gain earned on the change in the price of instruments held in the firm's accounts. Academic literature sets out the distinctions between making markets for customers and holding speculative positions in assets, but in general, the two types of trading are distinguishable by the volume of trading, the size of the positions, the length of time that positions remains open, and the volatility of profits and losses, among other factors. Regulations implementing this permitted activity should focus on these types of factors to assist regulators in distinguishing between financial firms assisting their clients versus those engaged in proprietary trading. Vigorous and robust regulatory oversight of this issue will be essential to the prevent "market-making" from being used as a loophole in the ban on proprietary trading.

The administration's draft language, the original section 619 contemplated by the Senate Banking Committee, and amendment 4101 each included the term "in facilitation of customer relations" as a permitted activity. The term was removed in the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act out of concern that this phrase was too subjective, ambiguous, and susceptible to abuse. At the same time, we recognize that the term was previously included to permit certain legitimate client-oriented services, such pre-market-making accumulation of small positions that might not rise to the level of fully "market-making" in a security or financial instrument, but are intended to nonetheless meet expected near-term client liquidity needs. Accordingly, while previous versions of the legislation referenced "market-making", the final version references "market-making-related" to provide the regulators with limited additional flexibility to incorporate those types of transactions to meet client needs, without unduly warping the common understanding of market-making.

We note, however, that "market-making-related" is not a term whose definition is without limits. It does not implicitly cover every time a firm buys an existing financial instrument with the intent to later sell it, nor does it cover situations in which a firm creates or underwrites a new security with the intent to market it to a client. Testimony by Gold-man Sachs Chairman Lloyd Blankfein and other Goldman executives during a hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations seemed to suggest that any time the firm created a new mortgage related security and began soliciting clients to buy it, the firm was "making a market" for the security. But one-sided marketing or selling securities is not equivalent to providing a two-sided market for clients buying and selling existing securities. The reality was that Goldman Sachs was creating new securities for sale to clients and building large speculative positions in high-risk instruments,
including credit default swaps. Such speculative activities are the essence of proprietary trading and cannot be properly considered within the coverage of the terms "market-making" or "market-making-related."

The subparagraph also specifically limits such underwriting and market-making-related activities to "reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, and counterparties." Essentially, the subparagraph creates two restrictions, one on the expected holding period and one on the intent of the holding. These two restrictions greatly limit the types of risks and returns for market-makers. Generally, the revenues for market-making by the covered firms should be made from the fees charged for providing a ready, two-sided market for financial instruments, and not from the changes in prices acquired and sold by the financial institution. The "near term" requirement connects to the provision in the definition of trading account whereby the account is defined as trading assets that are acquired "principally for the purpose of selling in the near term." The intent is to focus firms on genuinely making markets for clients, and not taking speculative positions with the firm's capital. Put simply, a firm will not satisfy this requirement by acquiring a position on the hope that the position will be able to be sold at some unknown future date for a trading profit.

Subparagraph (d)(1)(C) permits a banking entity to engage in "risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with and related to individual or aggregated positions, contracts, or other holdings of the banking entity that are designed to reduce the specific risks to the banking entity in connection with and related to such positions, contracts, or other holdings." This activity is permitted because its sole purpose is to lower risk.

While this subparagraph is intended to permit banking entities to utilize their trading accounts to hedge, the phrase "in connection with and related to individual or aggregated positions ..." was added between amendment 4101 and the final version in the conference report in order to ensure that the hedge applied to specific, identifiable assets, whether it be on an individual or aggregate basis. Moreover, hedges must be to reduce "specific risks" to the banking entity arising from these positions. This formulation is meant to focus banking entities on traditional hedges and prevent proprietary speculation under the guise of general "hedging." For example, for a bank with a significant set of loans to a foreign country, a foreign exchange swap may be an appropriate hedging strategy. On the other hand, purchasing commodity futures to "hedge" inflation risks that may generally impact the banking entity may be nothing more than proprietary trading under another name. Distinguishing between true hedges and covert proprietary trades may be one of the more challenging areas for regulators, and will require clear identification by financial firms of the specific assets and risks being hedged, research and analysis of market best practices, and reasonable regulatory judgment calls. Vigorous and robust regulatory oversight of this issue will be essential to the prevent "hedging" from being used as a loophole in the ban on proprietary trading.

Subparagraph (d)(1)(D) permits the acquisition of the securities and other affected financial instruments "on behalf of customers." This permitted activity is intended to allow financial firms to use firm funds to purchase assets on behalf of their clients, rather than on behalf of themselves. This subparagraph is intended, in particular, to provide reassurance that trading in "street name" for customers or in trust for customers is permitted.

In general, subparagraph (d)(1)(E) provides exceptions to the prohibition on investing in hedge funds or private equity funds, if such investments advance a "public welfare" purpose. It permits investments in small business investment companies, which are a form of regulated venture capital fund in which banks have a long history of successful participation. The subparagraph also permits investments "of the type" permitted under the paragraph of the National Bank Act enabling banks to invest in a range of low-income community development and other projects. The subparagraph also specifically mentions tax credits for historical building rehabilitation.
administered by the National Park Service, but is flexible enough to permit the regulators to include other similar low-risk investments with a public welfare purpose.

Subparagraph (d)(1)(F) is meant to accommodate the normal business of insurance at regulated insurance companies that are affiliated with banks. The Volcker Rule was never meant to affect the ordinary business of insurance: the collection and investment of premiums, which are then used to satisfy claims of the insured. These activities, while definitionally proprietary trading, are heavily regulated by State insurance regulators, and in most cases do not pose the same level of risk as other proprietary trading.

However, to prevent abuse, firms seeking to rely on this insurance-related exception must meet two essential qualifications. First, only trading for the general account of the insurance firm would qualify. Second, the trading must be subject to adequate State-level insurance regulation. Trading by insurance companies or their affiliates that is not subject to insurance company investment regulations will not qualify for protection here.

Further, where State laws and regulations do not exist or otherwise fail to appropriately connect the insurance company investments to the actual business of insurance or are found to inadequately protect the firm, the subparagraph's conditions will not be met.

Subparagraph (d)(1)(G) permits firms to organize and offer hedge funds or private equity funds as an asset management service to clients. It is important to remember that nothing in section 619 otherwise prohibits a bank from serving as an investment adviser to an independent hedge fund or private equity fund. Yet, to serve in that capacity, a number of criteria must be met.

First, the firm must be doing so pursuant to its provision of bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment advisory services to customers. Given the fiduciary obligations that come with such services, these requirements ensure that banking entities are properly engaged in responsible forms of asset management, which should tamp down on the risks taken by the relevant fund.

Second, subparagraph (d)(1)(G) provides strong protections against a firm bailing out its funds. Clause (iv) prohibits banking entities, as provided under paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (f), from entering into lending or similar transactions with related funds, and clause (v) prohibits banking entities from "directly or indirectly, guarantee[ing], assum[ing], or otherwise insur[ing] the obligations or performance of the hedge fund or private equity fund." To prevent banking entities from engaging in backdoor bailouts of their invested funds, clause (v) extends to the hedge funds and private equity funds in which such subparagraph (G) hedge funds and private equity funds invest.

Third, to prevent a banking entity from having an incentive to bailout its funds and also to limit conflicts of interest, clause (vii) of subparagraph (G) restricts directors and employees of a banking entity from being invested in hedge funds and private equity funds organized and offered by the banking entity, except for directors or employees "directly engaged" in offering investment advisory or other services to the hedge fund or private equity fund. Fund managers can have "skin in the game" for the hedge fund or private equity fund they run, but to prevent the bank from running its general employee compensation through the hedge fund or private equity fund, other management and employees may not.

Fourth, by stating that a firm may not organize and offer a hedge fund or private equity fund with the firm's name on it, clause (vi) of subparagraph (G) further restores market discipline and supports the restriction on firms bailing out funds on the grounds of reputational risk. Similarly, clause (viii) ensures that investors recognize that the funds are subject to market discipline by requiring that funds provide prominent disclosure that any losses of a hedge fund or private equity fund are borne by investors and not by the firm, and the firm must also comply with any other restrictions to ensure that investors do not rely on the firm, including any of its affiliates or subsidiaries, for a bailout.
Fifth, the firm or its affiliates cannot make or maintain an investment interest in the fund, except in compliance with the limited fund seeding and alignment of interest provisions provided in paragraph (4) of subsection (d). This paragraph allows a firm, for the limited purpose of maintaining an investment management business, to seed a new fund or make and maintain a "de minimis" co-investment in a hedge fund or private equity fund to align the interests of the fund managers and the clients, subject to several conditions. As a general rule, firms taking advantage of this provision should maintain only small seed funds, likely to be $5 to $10 million or less. Large funds or funds that are not effectively marketed to investors would be evasions of the restrictions of this section. Similarly, co-investments designed to align the firm with its clients must not be excessive, and should not allow for firms to evade the intent of the restrictions of this section.

These "de minimis" investments are to be greatly disfavored, and subject to several significant restrictions. First, a firm may only have, in the aggregate, an immaterial amount of capital in such funds, but in no circumstance may such positions aggregate to more than 3 percent of the firm's Tier 1 capital. Second, by one year after the date of establishment for any fund, the firm must have not more than a 3 percent ownership interest. Third, investments in hedge funds and private equity funds shall be deducted on, at a minimum, a one-to-one basis from capital. As the leverage of a fund increases, the capital charges shall be increased to reflect the greater risk of loss. This is specifically intended to discourage these high-risk investments, and should be used to limit these investments to the size only necessary to facilitate asset management businesses for clients.

Subparagraphs (H) and (I) recognize rules of international regulatory comity by permitting foreign banks, regulated and backed by foreign taxpayers, in the course of operating outside of the United States to engage in activities permitted under relevant foreign law. However, these subparagraphs are not intended to permit a U.S. banking entity to avoid the restrictions on proprietary trading simply by setting up an offshore subsidiary or reincorporating offshore, and regulators should enforce them accordingly. In addition, the subparagraphs seek to maintain a level playing field by prohibiting a foreign bank from improperly offering its hedge fund and private equity fund services to U.S. persons when such offering could not be made in the United States.

Subparagraph (J) permits the regulators to add additional exceptions as necessary to "promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United States." This general exception power is intended to ensure that some unforeseen, low-risk activity is not inadvertently swept in by the prohibition on proprietary trading. However, the subparagraph sets an extremely high bar: the activity must be necessary to promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United States, and not simply pose a competitive disadvantage or a threat to firms' profitability.

Paragraph (2) of section (d) adds explicit statutory limits to the permitted activities under paragraph (1). Specifically, it prevents an activity from qualifying as a permitted activity if it would "involve or result in a material conflict of interest," "result directly or indirectly in a material exposure ... to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies" or otherwise pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the firm or the financial stability of the United States. Regulators are directed to define the key terms in the paragraph and implement the restrictions as part of the rulemaking process. Regulators should pay particular attention to the hedge funds and private equity funds organized and offered under sub-paragraph (G) to ensure that such activities have sufficient distance from other parts of the firm, especially those with windows into the trading flow of other clients. Hedging activities should also be particularly scrutinized to ensure that information about client trading is not improperly utilized.
The limitation on proprietary trading activities that “involve or result in a material conflict of interest” is a companion to the conflicts of interest prohibition in section 621, but applies to all types of activities rather than just as-set-backed securitizations.

With respect to the definition of high-risk assets and high-risk trading strategies, regulators should pay close attention to the characteristics of assets and trading strategies that have contributed to substantial financial loss, bank failures, bankruptcies, or the collapse of financial firms or financial markets in the past, including but not limited to the crisis of 2008 and the financial crisis of 1998. In assessing high-risk assets and high-risk trading strategies, particular attention should be paid to the transparency of the markets, the availability of consistent pricing information, the depth of the markets, and the risk characteristics of the assets and strategies themselves, including any embedded leverage. Further, these characteristics should be evaluated in times of extreme market stress, such as those experienced recently. With respect to trading strategies, attention should be paid to the role that certain types of trading strategies play in times of relative market calm, as well as times of extreme market stress. While investment advisors may freely deploy high-risk strategies for their clients, attention should be paid to ensure that firms do not utilize them for their own proprietary activities. Barring high risk strategies may be particularly critical when policing market-making-related and hedging activities, as well as trading otherwise permitted under subparagraph (d)(1)(A). In this context, however, it is irrelevant whether or not a firm provides market liquidity: high-risk assets and high-risk trading strategies are never permitted.

Subsection (d), paragraph (3) directs the regulators to set appropriate additional capital charges and quantitative limits for permitted activities. These restrictions apply to both banking entities and nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board. It is left to regulators to determine if those restrictions should apply equally to both, or whether there may appropriately be a distinction between banking entities and non-bank financial companies supervised by the Board. The paragraph also mandates diversification requirements where appropriate, for example, to ensure that banking entities do not deploy their entire permitted amount of de minimis investments into a small number of hedge funds or private equity funds, or that they dangerously over-concentrate in specific products or types of financial products.

Subsection (e) provides vigorous anti-evasion authority, including record-keeping requirements. This authority is designed to allow regulators to appropriately assess the trading of firms, and aggressively enforce the text and intent of section 619.

The restrictions on proprietary trading and relationships with private funds seek to break the internal connection between a bank's balance sheet and taking risk in the markets, with a view towards reestablishing market discipline and refocusing the bank on its credit extension function and client services. In the recent financial crisis, when funds advised by banks suffered significant losses, those off-balance sheet funds came back onto the banks' balance sheets. At times, the banks bailed out the funds because the investors in the funds had other important business with the banks. In some cases, the investors were also key personnel at the banks. Regardless of the motivations, in far too many cases, the banks that bailed out their funds ultimately relied on taxpayers to bail them out. It is precisely for this reason that the permitted activities under subparagraph (d)(1)(G) are so narrowly defined.

Indeed, a large part of protecting firms from bailing out their affiliated funds is by limiting the lending, asset purchases and sales, derivatives trading, and other relationships that a banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board may maintain with the hedge funds and private equity funds it advises. The relationships that a banking entity maintains with and services it furnishes to its advised funds can provide reasons why and the means through which a firm will bail out an advised fund, be it through a direct loan, an asset acquisition, or through writing a derivative. Further, providing advisory services to a hedge fund or private equity fund creates a conflict of interest and risk because when a banking entity is itself determining the
investment strategy of a fund, it no longer can make a fully independent credit evaluation of the hedge fund or private equity fund borrower. These bailout protections will significantly benefit independent hedge funds and private equity funds, and also improve U.S. financial stability.

Accordingly, subsection (f), paragraph (1) sets forth the broad prohibition on a banking entity entering into any "covered transactions" as such term is defined in the Federal Reserve Act's section 23A, as if such banking entity were a member bank and the fund were an affiliate thereof. "Covered transactions" under section 23A includes loans, asset purchases, and, following the Dodd-Frank bill adoption, derivatives between the member bank and the affiliate. In general, section 23A sets limits on the extension of credit between such entities, but paragraph (1) of subsection (f) prohibits all such transactions. It also prohibits transactions with funds that are controlled by the advised or sponsored fund. In short, if a banking entity organizes and offers a hedge fund or private equity fund or serves as investment advisor, manager, or sponsor of a fund, the fund must seek credit, including from asset purchases and derivatives, from an independent third party.

Subsection (f), paragraph (2) applies section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act to a banking entity and its advised or sponsored hedge fund or private equity fund. This provides, inter alia, that transactions between a banking entity and its fund be conducted at arms length. The fact that section 23B also includes the provision of covered transactions under section 23A as part of its arms-length requirement should not be interpreted to undermine the strict prohibition on such transactions in paragraph (1).

Subsection (f), paragraph (3) permits the Board to allow a very limited exception to paragraph (1) for the provision of certain limited services under the rubric of "prime brokerage" between the banking entity and a third-party-advised fund in which the fund managed, sponsored, or advised by the banking entity has taken an ownership interest. Essentially, it was argued that a banking entity should not be prohibited, under proper restrictions, from providing limited services to unaffiliated funds, but in which its own advised fund may invest. Accordingly, paragraph (3) is intended to only cover third-party funds, and should not be used as a means of evading the general prohibition provided in paragraph (1). Put simply, a firm may not create tiered structures and rely upon paragraph (3) to provide these types of services to funds for which it serves as investment advisor.

Further, in recognition of the risks that are created by allowing for these services to unaffiliated funds, several additional criteria must also be met for the banking entity to take advantage of this exception. Most notably, on top of the flat prohibitions on bailouts, the statute requires the chief executive officer of firms taking advantage of this paragraph to also certify that these services are not used directly or indirectly to bail out a fund advised by the firm.

Subsection (f), paragraph (4) requires the regulatory agencies to apply additional capital charges and other restrictions to systemically significant nonbank financial institutions to account for the risks and conflicts of interest that are addressed by the prohibitions for banking entities. Such capital charges and other restrictions should be sufficiently rigorous to account for the significant amount of risks associated with these activities.

To give markets and firms an opportunity to adjust, implementation of section 620 will proceed over a period of several years. First, pursuant to subsection (b), paragraph (1), the Financial Stability Oversight Council will conduct a study to examine the most effective means of implementing the rule. Then, under paragraph (b)(2), the Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall each engage in rulemakings for their regulated entities, with the rulemaking coordinated for consistency through the Financial Stability Oversight Council. In coordinating the rulemaking, the Council should strive to avoid a "lowest common denominator" framework, and instead apply the best, most rigorous practice from each regulatory agency.
Pursuant to subsection (c), paragraph (1), most provisions of section 619 become effective 12 months after the issuance of final rules pursuant to subsection (b), but in no case later than 2 years after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Paragraph (c)(2) provides a 2-year period following effective date of the provision during which entities must bring their activities into conformity with the law, which may be extended for up to 3 more years. Special illiquid funds may, if necessary, receive one 5-year extension and may also continue to honor certain contractual commitments during the transition period. The purpose of this extended wind-down period is to minimize market disruption while still steadily moving firms away from the risks of the restricted activities.

The definition of "illiquid funds" set forth in subsection (h) paragraph (7) is meant to cover, in general, very illiquid private equity funds that have deployed capital to illiquid assets such as portfolio companies and real estate with a projected investment holding period of several years. The Board, in consultation with the SEC, should therefore adopt rules to define the contours of an illiquid fund as appropriate to capture the intent of the provision. To facilitate certainty in the market with respect to divestiture, the Board is to conduct a special expedited rulemaking regarding these conformance and wind-down periods. The Board is also to set capital rules and any additional restrictions to protect the banking entities and the U.S. financial system during this wind-down period.

We noted above that the purpose of section 620 is to review the long-term investments and other activities of banks. The concerns reflected in this section arise out of losses that have appeared in the long-term investment portfolios in traditional depository institutions.

Over time, various banking regulators have displayed expansive views and conflicting judgments about permissible investments for banking entities. Some of these activities, including particular trading strategies and investment assets, pose significant risks. While section 619 provides numerous restrictions to proprietary trading and relationships to hedge funds and private equity funds, it does not seek to significantly alter the traditional business of banking.

Section 620 is an attempt to reevaluate banking assets and strategies and see what types of restrictions are most appropriate. The Federal banking agencies should closely review the risks contained in the types of assets retained in the investment portfolio of depository institutions, as well as risks in affiliates' activities such as merchant banking. The review should dovetail with the determination of what constitutes "high-risk assets" and "high risk trading strategies" under paragraph (d)(2).

At this point, I yield to Senator Levin to discuss an issue that is of particular interest to him involving section 621's conflict of interest provisions.

Mr. Levin

I thank my colleague for the detailed explanation he has provided of sections 619 and 620, and fully concur in it. I would like to add our joint explanation of section 621, which addresses the blatant conflicts of interest in the underwriting of asset-backed securities highlighted in a hearing with Goldman Sachs before the Permanent Sub-committee on Investigations, which I chair.

The intent of section 621 is to prohibit underwriters, sponsors, and others who assemble asset-backed securities, from packaging and selling those securities and profiting from the securities' failures. This practice has been likened to selling someone a car with no brakes and then taking out a life insurance policy on the purchaser. In the asset-backed securities context, the sponsors and underwriters of the asset-backed securities are the parties who select and understand the underlying assets, and who are best positioned to design a security to succeed or fail. They, like the mechanic servicing a car, would know if the vehicle has been designed to fail. And so they must be prevented from securing hand-some rewards for designing and selling malfunctioning vehicles that undermine the asset-backed securities markets. It is for that reason that we prohibit
those entities from engaging in transactions that would involve or result in material conflicts of interest with the purchasers of their products.

Section 621 is not intended to limit the ability of an underwriter to support the value of a security in the aftermarket by providing liquidity and a ready two-sided market for it. Nor does it restrict a firm from creating a synthetic as-set-backed security, which inherently contains both long and short positions with respect to securities it previously created, so long as the firm does not take the short position. But a firm that underwrites an asset-backed security would run afoul of the provision if it also takes the short position in a synthetic asset-backed security that references the same as-sets it created. In such an instance, even a disclosure to the purchaser of the underlying asset-backed security that the underwriter has or might in the future bet against the security will not cure the material conflict of interest.

We believe that the Securities and Exchange Commission has sufficient authority to define the contours of the rule in such a way as to remove the vast majority of conflicts of interest from these transactions, while also protecting the healthy functioning of our capital markets.

In conclusion, we would like to acknowledge all our supporters, co-sponsors, and advisers who assisted us greatly in bringing this legislation to fruition. From the time President Obama announced his support for the Volcker Rule, a diverse and collaborative effort has emerged, uniting community bankers to old school financiers to reformers. Senator Merkley and I further extend special thanks to the original cosponsors of the PROP Trading Act, Senators Ted Kaufman, Sherrod Brown, and Jeanne Shaheen, who have been with us since the beginning.

Senator Jack Reed and his staff did yeoman's work in advancing this cause. We further tip our hat to our tireless and vocal colleague, Senator Byron Dorgan, who opposed the repeal of Glass-Steagall and has been speaking about the risks from proprietary trading for a number of years. Above all, we pay tribute to the tremendous labors of Chairman Chris Dodd and his entire team and staff on the Senate Banking Committee, as well as the support of Chairman Barney Frank and Representative Paul Kanjorski. We extend our deep gratitude to our staffs, including the entire team and staff at the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, for their outstanding work. And last but not least, we highlight the visionary leadership of Paul Volcker and his staff. Without the support of all of them and many others, the Merkley-Levin language would not have been included in the Conference Report.

We believe this provision will stand the test of time. We hope that our regulators have learned with Congress that tearing down regulatory walls without erecting new ones undermines our financial stability and threatens economic growth. We have legislated to the best of our ability. It is now up to our regulators to fully and faithfully implement these strong provisions.

I yield the floor to Senator Merkley.

Mr. Merkley. I thank my colleague for his remarks and concur in all respects.

• Merkley-Levin-Dodd Colloquy

Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, I rise to engage my colleagues, Senators Dodd and Levin, in a colloquy regarding some key aspects of our legislative intent behind sections 619 through 621, the Merkley-Levin rule on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest as included in the conference report. First, I would like to clarify several issues surrounding the "de minimis" investment provisions in subsection (d)(4). These provisions complement subsection (d)(1)(G), which permits firms to offer hedge funds and private equity funds to clients. "De minimis" investments under paragraph (4) are intended to facilitate these offerings principally by allowing a firm to start new funds and to maintain coinvestments in funds, which help the firm align its interests with those of its clients. During the initial start-up period, during which time firms may maintain 100 percent ownership, the fund should be relatively small, but sufficient to effectively implement the investment strategy. After the start up
period, a firm may keep an ongoing “alignment of interest” coinvestment at 3 percent of a fund. Our intent is not to allow for large, revolving "seed" funds to evade the strong restrictions on proprietary trading of this section, and regulators will need to be vigilant against such evasion. The aggregate of all seed and coinvestments should be immaterial to the banking entity, and never exceed 3 percent of a firm's Tier 1 capital. Second, I would like to clarify the intent of subsection (f)'s provisions to prohibit banking entities from bailing out funds they manage, sponsor, or advise, as well as funds in which those funds invest. The "permitted services" provisions outlined in subsection (f) are intended to permit banks to maintain certain limited "prime brokerage" service relationships with unaffiliated funds in which a fund-of-funds that they manage invests, but are not intended to permit fund-of-fund structures to be used to weaken or undermine the prohibition on bailouts. Given the risk that a banking entity may want to bail out a failing fund directly or its investors, the "permitted services" exception must be implemented in a narrow, well-defined, and arms-length manner and regulators are not empowered to create loopholes allowing high-risk activities like leveraged securities lending or repurchase agreements. While we implement a number of legal restrictions designed to ensure that prime brokerage activities are not used to bail out a fund, we expect the regulators will nevertheless need to be vigilant. Before I yield the floor to Senator Levin to discuss several additional items, let me say a word of thanks to my good friend, Chairman Dodd, for taking the time to join me in clarifying these provisions. I also honor him for his extraordinary leadership on the entire financial reform package. As a fellow member of the Banking Committee, it has been a privilege to work with him on the entire bill, and not just these critical provisions. I also would like to recognize Senator Levin, whose determined efforts with his Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations helped highlight the causes of the recent crisis, as well as the need for reform. It has been a privilege working with him on this provision.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator, and I concur with his detailed explanations. His tireless efforts in putting these commonsense restrictions into law will help protect American families from reckless risk-taking that endangers our financial system and our economy. The conflicts of interest provision under section 621 arises directly from the hearings and findings of our Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which dramatically showed how some firms were creating financial products, selling those products to their customers, and betting against those same products. This practice has been likened to selling someone a car with no brakes and then taking out a life insurance policy on the purchaser. In the asset-backed securities context, the sponsors and underwriters of the asset-backed securities are the parties who select and understand the underlying assets, and who are best positioned to design a security to succeed or fail. They, like the mechanic servicing a car, would know if the vehicle has been designed to fail. And so they must be prevented from securing handsome rewards for designing and selling malfunctioning vehicles that undermine the asset-backed securities markets. It is for that reason that we prohibit those entities from engaging in transactions that would involve or result in material conflicts of interest with the purchasers of their products. First, I would like to address certain areas which we exclude from coverage. While a strong prohibition on material conflicts of interest is central to section 621, we recognize that underwriters are often asked to support issuances of as-set-backed securities in the aftermarket by providing liquidity to the initial purchasers, which may mean buying and selling the securities for some time. That activity is consistent with the goal of supporting the offering, is not likely to pose a material conflict, and accordingly we are comfortable excluding it from the general prohibition. Similarly, market conditions change over time and may lead an underwriter to wish to sell the securities it holds. That is also not likely to pose a conflict. But regulators must act diligently to ensure that an underwriter is not making bets against the very financial products that it assembled and sold. Second, I would like to address the role of disclosures in relations to conflicts of interest. In our view, disclosures alone may not cure these types of conflicts in all cases. Indeed, while a meaningful disclosure may alleviate the appearance of a material conflict of interest in some circumstances, in others, such as if the disclosures cannot be made to the appropriate party or because the disclosure is not sufficiently
meaningful, disclosures are likely insufficient. Our intent is to provide the regulators with the authority and strong directive to stop the egregious practices, and not to allow for regulators to enable them to continue behind the fig leaf of vague, technically worded, fine print disclosures. These provisions shall be interpreted strictly, and regulators are directed to use their authority to act decisively to protect our critical financial infrastructure from the risks and conflicts inherent in allowing banking entities and other large financial firms to engage in high risk proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds and private equity funds. Mr. President, I would like to thank Chairman Dodd for his extraordinary dedication in shepherding this massive financial regulatory reform package through the Senate and the conference committee. This has been a long process, and he and his staff have been very able and supportive partners in this effort.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator, and I strongly concur with the intentions and interpretations set forth by the principal authors of these provisions, Senators Merkley and Levin, as reflecting the legislative intent of the conference committee. I thank Senators Merkley and Levin for their leadership, which was so essential in achieving the conference report provisions governing proprietary trading and prohibiting conflicts of interest.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I wish to ask my good friend, the Senator from Connecticut and the chairman of the Banking Committee, to engage in a brief discussion relating to the final Volcker rule and the role of venture capital in creating jobs and growing companies. I strongly support the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, including a strong and effective Volcker rule, which is found in section 619 of the legislation. I know the chairman recognizes, as we all do, the crucial and unique role that venture capital plays in spurring innovation, creating jobs and growing companies. I also know the authors of this bill do not intend the Volcker rule to cut off sources of capital for America's technology startups, particularly in this difficult economy. Section 619 explicitly exempts small business investment companies from the rule, and because these companies often provide venture capital investment, I believe the intent of the rule is not to harm venture capital investment. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my friend, the Senator from California, for her support and for all the work we have done together on this important issue. Her understanding is correct. The purpose of the Volcker rule is to eliminate excessive risk taking activities by banks and their affiliates while at the same time preserving safe, sound investment activities that serve the public interest. It prohibits proprietary trading and limits bank investment in hedge funds and private equity for that reason. But properly conducted venture capital investment will not cause the harms at which the Volcker rule is directed. In the event that properly conducted venture capital investment is excessively restricted by the provisions of section 619, I would expect the appropriate Federal regulators to exempt it using their authority under section 619(J).

Mr. BAYH. I thank the Chairman. With respect to the Volcker Rule, the conference report states that banking entities are not prohibited from purchasing and disposing of securities and other instruments in connection with underwriting or market making activities, provided that activity does not exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties. I want to clarify this language would allow banks to maintain an appropriate dealer inventory and residual risk positions, which are essential parts of the market making function. Without that flexibility, market makers would not be able to provide liquidity to markets.

Mr. DODD. The gentleman is correct in his description of the language.
Himes-Frank Colloquy

Mr. HIMES. Madam Speaker, I rise to enter into a colloquy with Chairman Frank. I want to clarify a couple of important issues under section 619 of the bill, the Volcker Rule. The bill would prohibit firms from investing in traditional private equity funds and hedge funds. Because the bill uses the very broad Investment Company Act approach to define private equity and hedge funds, it could technically apply to lots of corporate structures, and not just the hedge funds and private equity funds. I want to confirm that when firms own or control subsidiaries or joint ventures that are used to hold other investments, that the Volcker Rule won't deem those things to be private equity or hedge funds and disrupt the way the firms structure their normal investment holdings.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. If the gentleman would yield, let me say, first, you know, there has been some mockery because this bill has a large number of pages, although our bills are smaller, especially on the page. We do that-by the way, there are also other people who complain sometimes that we've left too much discretion to the regulators. It's a complex bill dealing with a lot of subjects, and we want to make sure we get it right, and we want to make sure it's interpreted correctly. The point the gentleman makes is absolutely correct. We do not want these overdone. We don't want there to be excessive regulation. And the distinction the gentleman draws is very much in this bill, and we are confident that the regulators will appreciate that distinction, maintain it, and we will be there to make sure that they do.